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Abstract
We investigate a generalization of the notion of XML security view introduced by Stoica and Farkas [22] and later
refined by Fan et al. [12]. The model consists of access control policies specified over DTDs with XPath expression
for data-dependent access control policies. We provide the notion of security views for characterizing information
accessible to authorized users. This is a transformed (sanitized) DTD schema that can be used by users for query
formulation and optimization. Then we show an algorithm to materialize “authorized” version of the document
from the view and an algorithm to construct the view from an access control specification. We show that our view
construction combined with materialization produces the same result as the direct application of the DTD access
specification on the document. To avoid the overhead of view materialization in query answering, user queries should
undergo rewriting so that they are valid over the original DTD schema, and thus the query answer is computed from
the original XML data. We provide an algorithm for query rewriting and show its performance compared with the
naive approach, i.e. the approach when query is evaluated over materialized view. We also propose a number of
generalizations of possible security policies.
1 Introduction
XML [5] has become the prime standard for data representation and exchange on the Web. In light of the sensitive
nature of many business data applications, this also raises the important issue of security in XML and the selective
exposure of information to different classes of users based on their access privileges.
To address this issue we need simple, powerful, fine grained authorization mechanisms that
1. can control access to both content and structure;
2. can be enforced without annotating the entire document;
3. still provide a “sanitized” schema information to users.
While specifications and enforcement of access control are well understood for traditional databases [10, 17, 20, 21],
the study of security for XML is less established. Although a number of security models have been proposed for
XML [4, 7, 9, 16, 18, 19], these models do not meet criterion 3 above and, to a lesser extent, criterion 2. More
specifically, these proposed models enforce security constraints at the document level by fully annotating the entire
XML document/database [7, 4, 9]; these require expensive view materialization, and complicate the consistency and
integrity maintenance.
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The most important limitation of the mainstream models is the lack of support for authorized users to query the data:
they either do not provide in advance any schema information of the accessible data, or expose the entire original
document DTD (or its “loosened” variant). If no schema is provided, or cannot be derived from the chosen access
control model, the solution is hardly practical for large and complex documents. If we want to query an hospital
databases just to know who is the nurse on duty in ward 13, there is little sense in sanitizing the entire databases
(clinical records and all) which is largely irrelevant for us.
Furthermore, fixing the access control policies at the instance level without providing or computing a schema, makes
it difficult for the security officer to understand how the authorized view of a document for a user or a class of users
will actually look like.
On the other side, revelation of excessive schema information might lead to security breaches: an unauthorized user
can deduct or infer confidential information via multiple queries (essentially if the authorization specifications are not
closed under intersection) and analysis of the schema even if just accessible nodes are queried.
To overcome this limitations, the notion of XML security views was initially proposed by Stoica and Farkas [22] and
later refined by Fan et al. [12]. The basic idea is to provide a schema that describes the data that can be seen by the
user, as well as a (hidden) set of Xpath expressions that describe how to compute the data in the view from the original
data.
1.1 Our Contribution.
We generalize the notion of XML security views to arbitrary DAG DTDs and to conditional constraints expressed in a
very expressive XPath fragment. For each view, a security specification is a simple extension of the document DTD D
with security annotations and security policies exploited to obtain full annotation from partial one. This specification
has the advantage that can be easily implemented with little or no modification to state-of-the-art DTD parsers and
offer security officers an intuitive feeling of the actual look of sanitized document.
From the specification, we derive a security view V consisting of a view DTD Dv and a function σ defined via XPath
queries. The view DTD Dv shows only the data that is accessible according to the specification. The view is provided
to the users so that they can formulate their queries over the view. The function σ is withheld from the users, and is
used to extract accessible data from the actual XML documents to populate a structure conforming to Dv .
Query optimization can then be performed by users (using security view) and then by the system (by expanding and
optimizing the selection function). Thus, it is no longer necessary to process an entire document and only relevant
data is retrieved. Moreover, the users can only access data via Dv , and no information beyond the view can be inferred
from (multiple) queries posed on Dv .
Thus the users can only access data via Dv , and no information beyond the view can be inferred from (multiple)
queries targeted at Dv .
In the current paper, we also implement and test experimentally the performance of the security view model described
above. To this end, we define a rewriting algorithm that takes a user query over the a security view, and rewrites the
query into a query over the original database. We then compare the cost of evaluating this query with that of evaluating
the original query over a materialized view of the data, and show that significant performance improvements.
More specifically, the main contributions of the paper include:
• A refined version of access policies over XML documents using conditional annotations at DTD level;
• A notion of security view that enforces the security constraints at the schema level and provides a view DTD
characterizing them;
• An efficient algorithm for materializing security views, which ensures that views conform to view DTDs;
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• An algorithm for deriving a security view from a specification of security annotations;
• An algorithm for deriving a security view from a specification of security policies as XPath expressions;
• A query rewriting algorithm and its evaluation.
1.2 Plan of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First we present preliminary notions on XML and XPath in Sec. 2.
In Sec. 3 we provide a motivating example. Next we introduce the notion of security specification (Sec. 4) and
the notion of view (Sec. 5). We show how to materialize a view and that using views is equivalent to annotating
directly the document (Sec. 6). In Sec. 7 we describe classification of security policies with respect to consistency
and completeness properties. Some extensions of our model are outlined in Sec. 8. In Sec. 9 we show algorithm for
rewriting queries. Implementation issues are discussed in Sec. 10. Evaluation of rewriting algorithm is provided in
Sec. 11. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sec. 12.
2 A Primer On XML and XPath
We first review DTDs (Document Type Definitions [5]) and XPath [8] queries.
Definition 2.1: A DTDD is a triple (Ele, P, root), whereEle is a finite set of element types; root is a distinguished
type in Ele, and P is a function defining element types such that for each A in Ele, P (A) is a regular expression over
Ele ∪ {str}, where str is a special type denoting PCDATA, We use ² to denote the empty word, and “+”, “,”, and
“∗” to denote disjunction, concatenation, and the Kleene star, respectively. We refer to A → P (A) as the production
of A. For all element types B occurring in P (A), we refer to B as a subelement type (or a child type) of A and to A
as a generator (or a parent type) of B. 2
We assume that DTD is non-recursive, i.e., that the graph has no cycles. Sec. 8 discusses this limitation.
Definition 2.2: An XML tree T conforms to a DTD D iff
1. the root of T is the unique node labelled with root;
2. each node in T is labelled either with an Ele type A, called an A element, or with str, called a text node;
3. each A element has a list of children of elements and text nodes such that their labels form a word in the regular
language defined by P (A);
4. each text node carries a str value and is a leaf of the tree.
We call T an instance of D if T conforms to D. 2
Example 2.1: Consider a DTD describing database of applications for PhD program. The DTD D is defined to be
(Ele, P, db), where
Ele = {applications, application, student-data, department, degree,
waiver, name, recomm-letter, evaluator, title, institution,
letter, rating, English, MS, PhD, free-text, PDF, TXT,
unreliable, reason, favorable, unfavorable};
and the function P is defined as follows (we omit the definition of elements whose type is str):
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Figure 1: The graph representation of the document DTD D
P(applications) = (application*)
P(application) = (student-data, recomm-letter*, unreliable*)
P(student-data) = (department, degree, waver, name)
P(recomm-letter) = (evaluator, letter)
P(evaluator) = (name, title, institution)
P(letter) = (favorable|unfavorable)
P(favorable) = (rating, free-text)
P(unfavorable) = (rating, free-text)
P(rating) = (English, MS, PhD)
P(free-text) = (PDF|TXT)
P(unreliable) = (recomm-letter, reason)
An XML tree conforming to D consists of a list of applications for PhD/MS program. Each application is initiated
by a student described via student-data with an attribute id uniquely identifying student and representing student’s
login name. Student-data is composed of name, desired degree (PhD or MS) department, and waiver. The latter field
may take values “true” or “false” and means that student does (does not) waive his/her right to inspect the content of
recommendation letters. Application is supported by several letters of recommendation (recomm-letter), some of them
can be classified as unreliable under some reason. Each letter has letter body and is provided by a separate evaluator
having name, title and institution attributes. Evaluator places comments on applicant’s skills in free-text field, which
is either PDF or TXT file, and rates applicant’s English proficiency, achievements during MS program and possible
contribution in PhD program. Letters of recommendation are reviewed by admission committee and are assigned to a
category favorable or unfavorable depending on the context.
The corresponding DTD is depicted on Fig. 1. 2
Remark 2.1 Regular expressions in a DTD are 1-unambiguous as required by the XML Standard [5]. In contrast
to [12], we consider DTDs defined with general (1-unambiguous) regular expressions.
We consider a class of XPath queries, which corresponds to the CoreXPath of Gottlob et al. [15] augmented with the
union operator and atomic tests and which is denoted by Benedict et al. [12] as X .
The XPath axes we consider as primitive are child, parent, ancestor-or-self, descendant-or-self,
self. Gottlob, Koch and Pichler [15] show how the semantics of such axes can be computed in polynomial time. In
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the sequel we denote by θ one of those primitive axes and by θ−1 its inverse. Notice that each primitive axis has its
inverse within the same set of primitives. For instance descendant-or-self−1 = ancestor-or-self.
Definition 2.3: An XPath expression in X is defined by the following grammar:
〈xpath〉 ::= 〈path〉 | ‘/‘ 〈path〉
〈path〉 ::= 〈step〉 (‘/‘ 〈step〉)∗
〈step〉 ::= θ | θ‘[‘ 〈qual〉 ‘]‘ | 〈path〉 ‘ ∪ ‘ 〈path〉
〈qual〉 ::= A | ‘ ∗ ‘ | op c | 〈xpath〉 |
〈qual〉 and 〈qual〉 | 〈qual〉 or 〈qual〉 |
not 〈qual〉 | ‘(‘ 〈qual〉 ‘)‘
where θ stands for an axis, c is a str constant, A is a label, op stands for one of =, <, >,≤,≥. The result of the qual
production is called qualifier and is denoted by q. We denote by XNoTest the fragment build without the op c test. 2
For sake of readability, we ignore the difference between xpath and path we denote both with p. We also abbreviate
self with ², child[A]/p with A/p, descendant-or-self[A]/p with //A/p, q[op c] with q op c and p =
p1/p2, where p2 is //p′2, is written p as p1//p′2. The ancestor axis is also abbreviated as ../.
The semantics of XPath is obtained by adapting to our fragment the S→, S←, E operators proposed by Gottlob et
al. [15] and is identical to proposal of Benedickt et al. [3]. Intuitively S→ [|p|] (N) gives all nodes that are reachable
from a node in N using the path p. The S← [|p|] functions gives all nodes from which a path p starts to arrive to
queried node. The E [|q|] function evaluates qualifiers and returns all nodes that satisfy q.
For sake of readability we overload the θ-symbol to stand for both the semantics and the syntax of axes. So given a set
of nodes N of a document T we have that θ(N) = {m | n θm for n ∈ N}. In other words, θ(N) returns the nodes
that are reachable according the axis from a node in N . By T (A) we denote the set of nodes that have element type
A. By T (∗) we denote all nodes of a document.
The semantics of the other operators is shown in Fig. 2.
3 A Motivating Example
The need to provide users with a schema-level security view is illustrated by the access control requirements in Exam-
ple 3.1.
Example 3.1: The applicant can access only his/her own data located under field student-data. Access to fields
favorable and unfavorable is forbidden, while visibility of rating and free-text is established according
to the accessibility to field letter. The latter is accessible if the waiver is true (data-dependent access). Moreover,
the applicant should not be aware of reliability of the recommendation letters as the leakage of this information to
recommenders might lead to diplomatic incidents. 2
How can such constraints be enforced? Cho et al. [7] and Bertino et al. [4] enforce these constraints directly on the
XML document. Damiani et al. [9] express their security specifications as sets of XPath expressions. However they
also transform their XPath specifications into an annotation of the entire document. So we have systems that do specify
how to restrict access at the data level.
An important question remains unanswered: what schema information should be provided to the user? To formulate
and process queries, the user needs a schema describing the accessible data. One solution, suggested by Damiani et
al. [9], is to loosen the original DTD (make forbidden nodes optional). In some cases it is unacceptable to expose
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S→ [|/p|] (N) = S→ [|p|] ({root})
S→ [|θ[q]|] (N) = θ(N) ∩ E [|q|]
S→ [|θ[q]/p|] (N) = θ(S→ [|p|] (N)) ∩ E [|q|]
S→ [|p1 ∪ p2|] (N) = S→ [|p1|] (N) ∪ S→ [|p2|] (N)
S→ [|(p1 ∪ p2)/p|] (N) = S→ [|p1/p|] (N) ∪ S→ [|p2/p|] (N)
S← [|/p|] =
{ {n occurs inT} if root ∈ S← [|/p|]
∅ otherwise
S← [|θ[q]|]N = θ−1(N ∩ E [|q|])
S← [|θ[q]/p|]N = θ−1(S← [|p|] ∩ E [|q|])
S← [|p1 ∪ p2|] = S← [|p1|] ∪ S← [|p2|]
S← [|(p1 ∪ p2)/p|] = S← [|p1/p|] ∪ S← [|p2/p|]
E [|A|] = T (A)
E [|q1andq2|] = E [|q1|] ∩ E [|q2|]
E [|q1orq2|] = E [|q1|] ∪ E [|q2|]
E [|notq|] = {n occurs in T} \ E [|q2|]
E [|p|] = S← [|p|]
Figure 2: The semantics of operators
even the loosened DTD to final user. To illustrate this, consider two permissible XPath queries about a letter of
recommendation:
Q1 /applications/application//evaluator
Q2 /applications/application/recomm-letter/evaluator
The query Q1 finds all elements of type evaluator that are associated with recommendation letter (including those
of unreliable category), while Q2 returns only evaluators of reliable recomm-letters. Although most of the
unreliable data is hidden, a look at the document DTD allows one to infer which letters are considered as unreliable:
the evaluators in Q1 that are not returned by Q2; thus a security breach.
All evaluators are visible, but by different ways. The trick is to make requestor unable to distinguish those ways.
In traditional relational databases users access a View of the data and permissions are assigned to views [17, 20]. A
user may be denied the knowledge of the existence of an attribute of a relational schema. What we need here is a view
of the document (at the schema level) that the user can use for queries, but that hides not only data but also structural
information.
We borrow from Stoica and Farkas [22] the notion of access control model for XML that specifies and enforces
security constraints at the schema level. For the actual notation we refine and generalize the proposal from Fan et
al. [12]: authorizations are defined on a document DTD by annotating element types with Y/N or XPath qualifiers,
indicating their accessibility.
From such a specification we can then infer a view DTD Dv and a selection function σ defined via XPath queries. The
view DTD Dv shows only the data that is accessible according to the specification. The view is provided to the users
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(a) Security annotation defined at DTD level
q1
.= ancestor::application[./student-data[@id = $login]/waiver/text() = “true′′]];
q2
.= ./student-data[./@id = $login]]
q3
.= ancestor::application[./student-data[@id = $login];
(b) Meaning of security annotation qualifiers
Figure 3: Security annotation for competing student
so that they can formulate their queries over the view. This means that the users can only access data via Dv , and no
information beyond the view can be inferred from (multiple) queries targeted at Dv .
The function σ is withhold to the users, and is used to extract accessible data from the actual XML documents with
XPath queries to populate a document structure conforming to Dv .
4 Security Specifications
In this section we present our access-control specification language. An access specification S is an extension of a
document DTD D associating security annotations with productions of D.
Definition 4.1: A authorization specification S is a pair (D, ann), where D is a (document) DTD, ann is a partial
mapping such that, for each production A→ P (A) and each child element type B in P (A), ann(A,B), if explicitly
defined, is an annotation of the form:
ann(A,B) ::= Q[q] | Y | N
where [q] is a qualifier in our fragmentX of XPath. A special case is the root ofD, for which we define ann(root) = Y
by default. 2
Intuitively, annotating production rule P (A) of the DTD with an unconditional annotation is a security constraint
expressed at the schema level: Y or N indicates that the corresponding B children of A elements in an XML document
conforming to the DTD will always be accessible (Y) or always inaccessible (N), no matter what the actual values of
these elements in the document are. If ann(A,B) is not explicitly defined, then B inherits the accessibility of A. On
the other hand, if ann(A,B) is explicitly defined it may override the accessibility of B obtained via propagation.
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<!ELEMENT applications (application*)>
<!ELEMENT application (student-data, recommendation-letter*, unreliable*)>
<!ELEMENT unreliable (recommendation-letter, reason)>
<!ELEMENT student-data (department, degree, name, waiver)>
<!ELEMENT recommendation-letter (evaluator, letter)>
<!ELEMENT evaluator (title, institution, name)>
<!ELEMENT letter (favorable|unfavorable)>
<!ELEMENT favorable (rating, free-text)>
<!ELEMENT unfavorable (rating, free-text)>
<!ELEMENT rating (MS, PhD, English)>
<!ELEMENT free-text (TXT|PDF)>
<!ELEMENT reason (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT waiver (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT department (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT degree (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT title (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT institution (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT MS (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT PhD (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT English (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT TXT (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT PDF (#PCDATA)>
<!ATTLIST student-data id CDATA #IMPLIED>
<!ATTLIST applications
hierarchy_security_policy CDATA #FIXED "topDown"
local_security_policy CDATA #FIXED "closed"
hierarchy_conflict_security_policy CDATA #FIXED "hierarchyFirst"
value_conflict_security_policy CDATA #FIXED "denialFirst"
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST application security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Q"
security_annotation_xpath CDATA #FIXED "./student-data[@id=$login]">
<!ATTLIST rating security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Q"
security_annotation_xpath CDATA #FIXED
"ancestor::*[self::application[./student-data[@id=$login]/waiver/text()=’true’]]">
<!ATTLIST free-text security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Q"
security_annotation_xpath CDATA #FIXED
"ancestor::*[self::application[./student-data[@id=$login]/waiver/text()=’true’]]">
<!-- recommendation-letter tag should be visible under unreliable tag
if ancestor "application" is visible-->
<!ATTLIST recommendation-letter security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Q"
security_annotation_xpath CDATA #FIXED
"ancestor::*[self::application[./student-data[@id=$login]]]">
<!ATTLIST letter security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST unreliable security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "N">
Figure 4: Partially annotated DTD
At the data level, the intuition is the following: given an XML document T , the document is typed with respect to the
DTD, and the annotations of the DTD are attached to the corresponding nodes of the document, resulting in a partially
annotated XML document. Intuitively, given an XML tree T conforming toD, the specification S uniquely defines the
accessibility of the elements of T . Since T is an instance of D and the regular expressions in D are 1-unambiguous,
this implies that each B element v of T has a unique parent A element and a unique production that “parses” the A
subtree. Then we convert the document T to a fully annotated one by labelling all of the unlabelled nodes with Y or N.
This is done by evaluating the qualifiers and replacing them by Y or N annotations, and then by a suitable policy for
completing the annotation of the yet labelled nodes of the tree. When everything is labelled we remove all N-labelled
nodes from T .
We should emphasize that semantics of qualifiers presented in this paper is different from that of in [12]. According
to [12] a false evaluation of the qualifier is considered as “no label” and requires the inheritance of an access label
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(a) Security DTD view
xp1 = ./student-data[@id = $login]
xp2 = ./letter/(favorable ∪ unfavorable)/rating[q]
xp3 = ./letter/(favorable ∪ unfavorable)/free-text[q]
xp4 = ./(² ∪ unreliable)/recomm-letter
where q = applications/application/student-data/waiver = “true′′
(b) Meaning of XPath expressions
Figure 5: Security view for competing student
from the nearest labelled ancestors, while we assume that once evaluated on the document, a qualifier is mapped to
either Y or N. In other words, our qualifiers are locally determined so that an administrator has a clear understanding
of what will happen. In contrast with approach of Fan et al. it is not possible to predict what will happen unless the
administrators has a clear view of the data in the “entire” document (if we allow for ancestors queries in XPath) which
is unlikely to be the case for even moderately large documents.
Example 4.1: In Fig. 3(a) we show an example of security specification: paths to unconditionally allowed (forbidden)
element types from their corresponding parents are marked with Y(N), and conditionally accessible element types
are marked by qualifiers q1, q2 and q3 (Fig. 3(b)). $login is a dynamic variable that is assigned at run time and
depends on the student’s login name. Fig. 4 shows an input DTD file that can be encoded according to the conditions
of Example 3.1. Note that application and recomm-letter have accessibility condition q1 and q3 respectively,
while accessibility of elements rating, free-text is described by qualifier q2. 2
Example 4.2: The partial annotation generated by the policy in Figure 3(a) is extended to a full annotation by la-
belling the element types favorable and unfavorable under letter and reason under unreliable with
N irrespectively of their position. On the other hand, evaluator under recomm-letter is labelled as Y. All the
other element types labelling depends on the query evaluation. 2
More sophisticated ways of annotation are presented in [14, 23]. In particular, [14] uses XQuery to define derivation
access control rules from the existing ones that are organized as XACL privilege triples <object, subject, access-
right> [19]. The proposal of [23] is based on the conception of Role Graph Model merged with the conception of
RBAC for object-oriented databases.
The construction of a fully annotated document depends heavily on the overall security policy that is chosen to get
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completeness [10]. The top-down procedure that we describe next is the result of most-specific-takes-precedence
policy which simply says that an unlabelled node takes the security label of its first labelled ancestor. Damiani et
al. [9] use a closed policy as default: if a node is not labeled then label it as N. We return to this issue in Sec. 7, where
we extend our model to allow alternate propagation techniques.
Definition 4.2: Let (D, ann) be a authorization specification and T a XML document conforming to D. The autho-
rized version TA of T according the authorization specification is obtained from T as follows:
1. Type T with respect to D and label nodes with ann values;
2. Evaluate qualifiers top down starting from the root and replace annotations by Y or N depending on the result;
3. For each unlabelled node, label it with the annotation of its nearest labelled ancestor;
4. Delete all nodes labelled with N from the result, making all children of a deleted node v into children of v’s
parent.
The annotation of the document, before deleting nodes in the last step, is called the full annotation of T . 2
Example 4.3: Fig. 5(a) shows the security view generated from the security specification in Fig. 3(a). It hides con-
fidential information. Fig. 5(b) lists some of the XPath annotations that are used to populate the appropriate element
types form the original document DTD. 2
Since T is a tree (a node has only one ancestor) it is not possible to have a conflict on labelling. There are different
policy to extend the labelling that may lead to conflicts. We discuss this later in Sec. 7.
The pruning algorithm is more severe than that used by Damiani et al. [9] who delete only subtrees that are entirely
labelled N, and delete only the data from nodes labelled N with some descendant labelled Y. As a consequence, the
authorized view TA no longer conforms to the original DTD D, not even to its loosened variant.
Example 4.4: In example 3.1 since unreliable is forbidden, the user should not even know that it exists. So he
receives documents without it. 2
5 Security Views
We now turn to the enforcement of an access specification. To this end, we introduce the notion of security view which
consists of two parts. The first part is a schema that is seen by the user, while the second part is a function that is
hidden from the user, which describes how the data in the new schema should be derived from the original data. The
intuition behind our approach is similar to that of security views for relational databases in multi-level security [17]
and the notation is borrowed from [12].
We first present the syntactic definition of security views.
Definition 5.1: Let D be a DTD. A security view for D is a pair (Dv, σ) where Dv is a DTD and σ is a function from
pairs of element types such that for each element type A in Dv and element type B occurring in P (A), σ(A,B) is an
expression in X . 2
Definition 5.2: Let S = (Dv, σ) be a security view. The semantics of S is a mapping from documents T conforming
to D to documents TS such that
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1. TS conforms to Dv
2. The nodes of TS are a subset of the nodes of T , and their element type is unchanged.
3. For any node n of T which is in TS , let A be the element type of n, and let B1, . . . , Bm be the list of element
types that occur in P (A). Then the children of n in TS are⋃
1≤i≤m
S→ [|σ(A,Bi)|] ({n}) .
These nodes should be ordered according to the document order in the original document.
TS is called the materialized version of T w.r.t. the view S . 2
Definition 5.3: A valid security view is one for which the semantics are always well-defined, i.e., if for every document
T , its materialized version conforms to the security view DTD. 2
Not all views are valid: wrong typing, violated cardinality constraints, and other problems could be all causes of of a
view to be invalid. However, the views that we construct from an annotated DTD are valid.
Example 5.1: The view with the only production root → AA∗ and σ(root→ A,A) := (A = “alice”), is not
defined on the document having the string “alice” as the only A-child of root. 2
Example 5.2: The view with the productions root → A and A → B, where σ(root→ A,A) := A and
σ(A→ B,B) = parent/parent is invalid on any documents because the resulted materialized document can-
not be a tree. 2
Security specification and views are related as follows.
Definition 5.4: Let (D, ann) be a authorization specification, and let S = (Dv, σ) be a security view for D. We say
that S is data equivalent to (D, ann) iff for every document T , conforming to D, the materialized version TS coincides
with the authorized version TA. 2
Two weaker characterizations are based on the notion of data secrecy and data availability 1.
Definition 5.5: Let (D, ann) be a authorization specification, and S = (Dv, σ) a security view for D.
1. S guarantees data secrecy iff for every T conforming to D, and for every node n of T , if n occurs in TS then n
must also occur in the authorization version TA.
2. S guarantees data availability iff for every T conforming to D, and every node node n of T , if n occurs in
authorized tree TA then n occurs in materialized version TS .
2
Intuitively, a secrecy-preserving view assure us that no forbidden node is leaked whereas a availability-preserving view
is a guarantee that no permitted node is held from legitimate principals. Obviously if a view is data equivalent, then it
also guarantees secrecy and availability but the converse does not hold. Indeed a data equivalent view also “preserves
the structure” of the original document. We leave such concept of structure preservation informal at this stage, though
one may think to subsumption of XML schemas as a possible way to classify views.
1Sometimes these notions are also termed consistency and completeness in the literature [10] but that terminology can be misleading in our
context.
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Algorithm: MATERIALIZE
Input: a document T conforming to DTD D, a DTD View (Dv, σ)
Output: a materialized view TS of T or ⊥ (there is no such view)
1: for all nodes n of type A in T do
2: let A→ P (A) the corresponding rule in Dv
3: for all B occurring in P (A) do
4: precompute S→ [|σ (A→ P (A) , B)|] ({n})
5: assign to TS the root of T and mark it as unprocessed
6: while there are unprocessed nodes in TS do
7: select an unprocessed node n of type A with rule A→ P (A) in Dv
8: make the nodes in ⋃
B occurs in P (A)
S→ [|σ (A→ P (A) , B)|] ({n})
in T as unprocessed children of n in TS
9: if a child of n already occurs as a processed node in TS then
10: return ⊥ (invalid view)
11: make n as processed
Figure 6: Algorithm MATERIALIZE
Given a security view S = (Dv, σ) and document T conforming to a DTD D, we show how to construct TS in Fig. 6.
The following is immediate:
Proposition 5.1: If S = (Dv, σ) is a valid view for D, then the result of Algorithm MATERIALIZE is a document TS
that is the materialized version of T . 2
A classical question for relational database research, namely whether a view produced by the MATERIALIZE algorithm
is actually populated by some instances, has a trivial yes answer. Since the root of the document is always labelled Y,
the materialized view has always one node. We can show that for the XPath fragment we can be as efficient as we can
hope for. Indeed, Gottlob, Koch and Pichler [15] have shown that for CoreXPath (i.e. X without union and test) it is
f(|σ| , |T |) = |σ| × |T |. We extend their result to X without test without penalties in complexity and with a T factor
to the full X fragment.
We now study the complexity of the algorithm. Let f(n, d) be the complexity of evaluating an XPath expression of
size n on a document of size d. Gottlob et al. [15] have shown that for CoreXPath (i.e. X without union and test) it is
f(|σ| , |T |) = |σ| × |T |. We extend their result to X without test and with a factor of T to the full X fragment. Let |σ|
be the size of the largest XPath expression in the range of σ. Then:
Theorem 5.2: Algorithm MATERIALIZE computes a materialized view in time O(f(|σ|, |T |)× |T |). 2
Lemma 5.3: Every XPath query p ∈ XNoTest over a document T can be evaluated in time O(|p| × |T |). 2
Proof: The proof follows the line of Gottlob, Koch and Pichler [15] for the CoreXPath fragment (that is without
union of paths): we use the functions S→, S←, and E to compute a query tree which is then evaluated bottom-up to
yield the desired complexity result.
For the full fragment considered here, the naive implementation of union would lead to an exponential blow up because
S→ [|p1(p2 ∪ p3)|] (N) = S→ [|p1/p2|] (N) ∪ S→ [|p1/p2|] (N) the processing of p1 is duplicated.
To avoid this blow-up we use a query DAG instead of a query tree. Each path of the form S→ [|p1/(p2 ∪ p3)|] (N) is
mapped into a (single source) rooted DAG in which the root is labelled ∪ with two children, one corresponding to the
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root of S→ [|p2|] (X) and one corresponding to the root of S→ [|p3|] (X). The shared X leaf node is the root of the
S→ [|p1|] (N) node.
Formally, this is equivalent to say that S→ [|p1/(p2 ∪ p3)|] (N) is evaluated using the symbolic rightmost lazy evalu-
ation of (λX.S→ [|p2|] (X) ∪ S→ [|p3|] (X))S→ [|p1|] (N).
For the evaluation of the S← function we use a single target DAG for the construction of the query DAG.
With this construction each XPath expression can be transformed in time O(|p|) into a query DAG of size O(|p|) in
which each operation is a set operation that can be computed in time O(|T |) thus yielding the desired upper bound. 2
Lemma 5.4: Every XPath query p ∈ X over a document T can be evaluated in time O(|p| × |T |2). 2
The addition of the test operation increases slightly the complexity because the computation of the O (c) operator
requires the comparison of the str value c with the str value at every node of the tree. This yields a quadratic
increase in data complexity. Once the O (c) has been computed at the appropriate leaves of the query DAG, all other
operations can be done in time linear in the size of the document.
Corollary 5.5: Every valid DTD view whose annotations are in X , respectively in XNoTest , can be materialized in
O(|σ| × |T |3), resp. O(|σ| × |T |2), by Algorithm MATERIALIZE. 2
Proof: The first step of the algorithm takes up only O(|σ| × |T |3), resp. O(|σ| × |T |2), by using the construction
in Lemma 5.3, resp. Lemma 5.4, for the evaluation of XPath queries. For the subsequent processing the number of
iteration is bounded by the number of nodes in T and each step can be performed in O(|σ| × |T |) steps. 2
Remark 5.1 We cannot obtain a linear bound in the size of T because of the ancestor and descendant axis in the
XPath fragment under consideration. The materialization of each node of TS require the evaluation of a query over T
which may involve the entire original document.
6 From Authorization Specifications to Views
Our main result is to show how to construct a security view, given a document DTD and an authorization specification
on it. The idea behind our algorithm is to eliminate qualifiers by expanding each qualifier into a union of two element
types: one is the original element type, which is annotated Y, and the other is a new type, essentially a copy of the
original type, which is annotated N. Since the tag of an element uniquely determines the type, it follows that new type
names cannot match any nodes in a document that conforms to the original DTD. This is not a serious problem, as all
of these new type names are ultimately deleted in the final security view.
The next step expands the annotation to a “full annotation”. The notion of a full annotation was defined on annotated
documents, and we showed that every document has a unique full annotation. At the schema level, however, this is
not the case, as there may be several “paths” in the DTD that reach the same element type, each of which results in a
different annotation. We use a similar technique to the way we handle qualifiers, i.e., we introduce new element types,
and label the original one Y and the “copy” N. Finally, we delete all the element types that are labelled N, modifying
the regular expressions and the σ functions correspondingly.
We show the algorithm ANNOTATE VIEW in Fig. 7 and algorithm BUILD VIEW in Fig. 8.
Definition 6.1: Let S = (D, ann) be an authorization specification. The DTD constructed by ANNOTATE VIEW
algorithm is the fully annotated DTD corresponding to (D, ann). 2
Theorem 6.1: Let (D, ann) be a security specification where D is non-recursive. Algorithms ANNOTATE VIEW and
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Algorithm: ANNOTATE VIEW
Input: A authorization specification (D, ann)
Output: Fully annotated DTD D
1: Initialize Dv := D where ann is defined on Dv as on D;
2: for all production rules A→ P (A) in Dv do
3: for all element types B occurring in P (A) do
4: initialize σ (A→ P (A) , B) := B[²]
5: //Below we will eliminate qualifier annotation
6: for all element types B with ann(B) = Q[q] do
7: add to Dv a new element type B′ and a production rule B′ → P (B′)
8: set P (B′) := P (B)
9: for all element types C occurring in P (B′) do
10: σ (B′ → P (B′) , C) := σ (B → P (B) , C)
11: set ann(B) = Y and ann(B′) = N
12: for all production rules A→ P (A) do
13: if B occurs in P (A) then
14: σ (A→ P (A) , B) := B[q];
15: σ (A→ P (A) , B′) := B[¬q];
16: replace B by B +B′ in P (A)
17: //Below we will get fully annotated DTD D
18: while ann(B) of some element types B is undefined do
19: if all generators A of B have defined ann(A) then
20: if all ann(A) = Y then
21: set ann(B) := Y;
22: else if all ann(A) = N then
23: set ann(B) := N;
24: else
25: add to Dv a new element type B′ and a production rule B′ → P (B′)
26: set P (B′) := P (B)
27: for all element types C occurring in P (B′) do
28: σ (B′ → P (B′) , C) := σ (B → P (B) , C)
29: set ann(B) = Y, ann(B′) = N,
30: for all generators A of B do
31: if ann(A) = N then
32: replace B with B′ in P (A)
Figure 7: Algorithm ANNOTATE VIEW
Algorithm: BUILD VIEW
Input: Fully annotated DTD D
Output: A security view (Dv , σ)
1: for all element types B with ann(B) = N do
2: for all production rules A→ P (A) do
3: if B occurs in P (A) then
4: for all C that occurs in P (B) do
5: set σ (A→ P (A) , C) := σ (A→ P (A) , B) /σ (B → P (B) , C) ∪ σ (A→ P (A) , C)
6: replace B by P (B) in P (A) if B → P (B) exists and by ² otherwise
7: Dv consists of all the element types A for which ann(A) = Y, with the σ function restricted to these types.
Figure 8: Algorithm BUILD VIEW
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<!ELEMENT applications (application*,#application*)>
<!ELEMENT application (student-data,recommendation-letter*,#recommendation-letter*,unreliable*)>
<!ELEMENT #application (#student-data,recommendation-letter*,#recommendation-letter*,unreliable*)>
<!ELEMENT unreliable (recommendation-letter,#recommendation-letter,reason)>
<!ELEMENT student-data (department,degree,name,waiver)>
<!ELEMENT #student-data (#department,#degree,#name,#waiver)>
<!ELEMENT recommendation-letter (evaluator,letter)>
<!ELEMENT #recommendation-letter (#evaluator,letter)>
<!ELEMENT evaluator (title,institution,name)>
<!ELEMENT #evaluator (#title,#institution,#name)>
<!ELEMENT letter (favorable | unfavorable)>
<!ELEMENT favorable (rating,#rating,free-text,#free-text)>
<!ELEMENT unfavorable (rating,#rating,free-text,#free-text)>
<!ELEMENT rating (MS,PhD,English)><!ELEMENT #rating (#MS,#PhD,#English)>
<!ELEMENT free-text (TXT | PDF)><!ELEMENT #free-text (#TXT | #PDF)>
<!ELEMENT reason (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT waiver (#PCDATA)><!ELEMENT #waiver (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT department (#PCDATA)><!ELEMENT #department (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT degree (#PCDATA)><!ELEMENT #degree (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA)><!ELEMENT #name (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT title (#PCDATA)><!ELEMENT #title (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT institution (#PCDATA)><!ELEMENT #institution (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT MS (#PCDATA)><!ELEMENT #MS (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT PhD (#PCDATA)><!ELEMENT #PhD (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT PDF (#PCDATA)><!ELEMENT #PDF (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT English (#PCDATA)><!ELEMENT #English (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT TXT (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT #TXT (#PCDATA)>
Figure 9: Fully annotated DTD: element part
BUILD VIEW terminate and produce a valid security view. 2
Proof: We have loops in the algorithm ANNOTATE VIEW (steps 6 and 18) and in the algorithm BUILD VIEW (step 1).
Step 6 in ANNOTATE VIEW eliminates qualifiers from the authorization specification.
Step 18 in ANNOTATE VIEW is to extend the annotation to a “full” annotation, i.e., one where ann is defined as either
Y or N for every element type. We do this by a “top-down” traversal of the DTD, starting from the root. The fact that
DTD is non-recursive implies that whenever there remains at least one element type B with ann(B) undefined, there
must be one such B such that whenever B occurs in P (A), ann(A) has already been defined. For one such B, do the
following, and repeat until all element types are annotated. Thus 18 in ANNOTATE VIEW always terminates, whereas
step 1 in BUILD VIEW will terminate as it always reduces the number of element types in the DTD by one.
We next show that Dv is a DTD. Dv would fail to be a DTD only if, for some element type A in Dv , P (A) includes
an element type B that is deleted in step 7 of BUILD VIEW. Chose such an A and B such that B has no successor in
the DTD tree (we make use again of the non-recursiveness of D). Since B is deleted, ann(B) must be equal to N, and
therefore B is replaced by P (B) in step 1 of BUILD VIEW, a contradiction.
As we are considering only non-recursive DTDs, we must also show that the new DTD is non-recursive. But this
follows immediately, as any cycle Dv can be traced back to a cycle in D.
This shows that we get a security view. To prove it is valid, we must show that TS conforms to Dv . To do this, we
first examine T ′ the fully annotated version of T (Definition 4.2) and D′, the fully annotated DTD defined above. As
this point, we would like to show that T ′ conforms to D′, but there is a problem, namely that some of the nodes in
nodes in T ′ should to be typed by new element types that were introduced in D′, which is impossible. To get around
this problem, modify the definition of “conforms”, to allow each new element types B′ introduced by the algorithm to
type the same nodes that were typed by B.
With this modified definition of “conforms”, an examination of steps 6 and 18 of the algorithm ANNOTATE VIEW,
comparing them to the corresponding steps in the definition of T ′, shows that T ′ conforms to D′. Furthermore, a node
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<!ATTLIST applications
hierarchy_security_policy CDATA #FIXED "topDown"
value_conflict_security_policy CDATA #FIXED "denialFirst"
local_security_policy CDATA #FIXED "closed"
hierarchy_conflict_security_policy CDATA #FIXED "hierarchyFirst"
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST application security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #application security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST unreliable security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST student-data security_annotation_data #FIXED "N" id CDATA #IMPLIED>
<!ATTLIST #student-data security_annotation_data #FIXED "N" id CDATA #IMPLIED>
<!ATTLIST recommendation-letter security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #recommendation-letter security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST letter security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST favorable security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST evaluator security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST #evaluator security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST unfavorable security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST rating security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #rating security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST free-text security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #free-text security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST reason security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST waiver security_annotation_data #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #waiver security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST department security_annotation_data #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #department security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST degree security_annotation_data #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #degree security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST name security_annotation_data #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #name security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST title security_annotation_data #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #title security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST institution security_annotation_data #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #institution security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST MS security_annotation_data #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #MS security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST PhD security_annotation_data #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #PhD security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST English security_annotation_data #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #English security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST TXT security_annotation_data #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #TXT security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST PDF security_annotation_data #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST #PDF security_annotation_data #FIXED "N">
Figure 10: Fully annotated DTD: attribute part
in T ′ that is annotated N (resp. Y) will be typed by a type in D′ that is annotated N (resp. Y).
It follows immediately from the definitions, that if we take D′ with the σ function defined in algorithm ANNOTATE
VIEW, T ′ “conforms” to D′. As we delete nodes in step 5, we can show that this property is preserved, so that TS
“conforms” to Dv . Since all the new nodes have been deleted at this point, the new definition of “conforms” reduces
to the standard definition, completing the proof. 2
Note that our assumption that regular expressions in DTDs may be 1-ambiguous is essential, as the following example
shows.
Example 6.1: Consider the DTD with element types A, B, C, D, where D → CA(A + B) and D → (A + B)∗.
If ann(A) = ann(B) = ann(C) = Y, and ann(D) = N, then the security DTD computed by Algorithm ANNOTATE
VIEW will have the production D → (A + B) ∗ A(A + B), which is not equivalent to any 1-unambiguous regular
expression [6]. 2
In practice, if we really need to use 1-unambiguous regular expressions, one could approximate the expressions gen-
erated by the algorithm with 1-ambiguous expressions that capture a larger language ([2] describes one method to do
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<!ELEMENT applications (application*,recommendation-letter*,
((rating,free-text)|(rating,free-text))*,recommendation-letter*,
((rating,free-text)|(rating,free-text))*)>
<!ELEMENT application (student-data,recommendation-letter*,
((rating,free-text)|(rating,free-text))*,recommendation-letter*,
((rating,free-text)|(rating,free-text))*)>
<!ELEMENT recommendation-letter (evaluator,
((rating,free-text)|(rating,free-text))*)>
<!ELEMENT student-data (department,degree,name,waiver)>
<!ATTLIST student-data id CDATA #IMPLIED>
<!ELEMENT recommendation-letter (evaluator,
((rating,free-text)|(rating,free-text))*)>
<!ELEMENT evaluator (title,institution,name)>
<!ELEMENT rating (MS,PhD,English)>
<!ELEMENT rating (MS,PhD,English)>
<!ELEMENT degree (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT department (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT waiver (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT institution (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT PhD (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT MS (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT English (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT title (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT TXT (#PCDATA)>
Figure 11: DTD view Dv
this).
Example 6.2: Fully annotated DTD depicted on Fig. 9 is the result of application of the algorithm ANNOTATE VIEW
to partially annotated DTD of Fig. 4. Elements marked with # symbol are introduced artificially during the process of
qualifier elimination (step 6) and inheritance from differently annotated parents (step 18). Fig. 10 represents attribute
part of DTD. Note that artificial elements have security annotation N while initial elements are marked by Y. 2
Example 6.3: The result of application of BUILD VIEW to DTD of Fig. 10 is depicted on Fig. 11. Note that all security
related attributes (compared with input DTD annotation depicted on Fig. 4) are eliminated. Corresponding σ-function
is represented on Fig. 12. 2
Note, that σ-function has rules with contradictory conditions Q and not(Q) (e.g. 3–11, 14–22), therefore correspond-
ing σ will always return empty set. The same is true also for rule 2 because it contains both condition not(P ) and
R with subcondition P . These rules can be eliminated on the process of optimization which is an open issue and is
leaved for future work.
We now need a technical lemma.
Lemma 6.2: Let (D, ann) be a security specification where D is a not-recursive DTD and (Dv, σ) be the security view
that is constructed by Algorithms ANNOTATE VIEW and BUILD VIEW, for any sequence of element types B0. . .Bn
in the full annotated D such that (i) Bi+1 is a child type of Bi for i = 0 . . . n − 1, (ii) each Bi for i = 1 . . . n − 1 is
annotated N, there exists an XPath expression p and q1 . . . qn XPath qualifiers such that the following equation holds
for all set of nodes N :
S→ [|σ(B0 → P (B0) , Bn)|] (N) = S→ [|p|] (N) ∪ S→ [|B1[q1]/ · · · /Bn[qn]|] (N) .
2
Proof: The proof is by a nested induction on n and the number of iteration of step 1 of algorithm BUILD VIEW.
For the base case, n = 1, then B1 is a child of B0. Then, before step 1 of BUILD VIEW is executed, algorithm AN-
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applications -> P(applications):
1 sigma(applications, application)= application[P]
2 sigma(applications, recommendation-letter) = application[not(P)]/recommendation-letter[R]
3 sigma(applications, rating) =
application[ not(P])]/recommendation-letter[ not (Q)]/letter/favorable/rating[Q]
4 sigma(applications, free-text) =
application[ not(P)]/recommendation-letter[ not(Q)]/letter/favorable/free-text[Q]
5 sigma(applications, rating) =
application[ not(P)]/recommendation-letter[ not(Q)]/letter/unfavorable/rating[Q]
6 sigma(applications, free-text) =
application[ not(P)]/recommendation-letter[ not(Q)]/letter/unfavorable/free-text[Q]
7 sigma(applications, recommendation-letter) =
application[ not(P)]/unreliable/recommendation-letter[R]
8 sigma(applications, rating) =
application[ not(P)]/unreliable/recommendation-letter[not(Q)]/letter/favorable/rating[Q]
9 sigma(applications, free-text) =
application[ not(P)]/unreliable/recommendation-letter[not(Q)]/letter/favorable/free-text[Q]
10 sigma(applications, rating) =
application[ not(P)]/unreliable/recommendation-letter[not(Q)]/letter/unfavorable/rating[Q]
11 sigma(applications, free-text) =
application[ not(P)]/unreliable/recommendation-letter[not(Q)]/letter/unfavorable/free-text[Q]
application -> P(application):
12 sigma(application, student-data) = student-data
13 sigma(application, recommendation-letter) = recommendation-letter[R]
14 sigma(application, rating) = recommendation-letter[ not(Q)]/letter/favorable/rating[Q]
15 sigma(application, free-text) = recommendation-letter[not(Q)]/letter/favorable/free-text[Q]
16 sigma(application, rating) = recommendation-letter[not(Q)]/letter/unfavorable/rating[Q]
17 sigma(application, free-text) = recommendation-letter[not(Q)]/letter/unfavorable/free-text[Q]
18 sigma(application, recommendation-letter) = unreliable/recommendation-letter[R]
19 sigma(application, rating) = unreliable/recommendation-letter[not(Q)]/letter/favorable/rating[Q]
20 sigma(application, free-text) = unreliable/recommendation-letter[not(Q)]/letter/favorable/free-text[Q]
21 sigma(application, rating) = unreliable/recommendation-letter[not(Q)]/letter/unfavorable/rating[Q]
22 sigma(application, free-text) = unreliable/recommendation-letter[not(Q)]/letter/unfavorable/free-text[Q]
student-data -> P(student-data):
23 sigma(student-data, department) = department
24 sigma(student-data,degree) = degree
25 sigma(student-data, name) = name
26 sigma(student-data, waiver) = waiver
recommendation-letter -> P(recommendation-letter):
27 sigma(recommendation-letter, evaluator) = evaluator
28 sigma(recommendation-letter, rating) = letter/favorable/rating[Q]
29 sigma(recommendation-letter, free-text) = letter/favorable/free-text[Q]
30 sigma(recommendation-letter, rating) = letter/unfavorable/rating[Q]
31 sigma(recommendation-letter, free-text) = letter/unfavorable/free-text[Q]
evaluator -> P(evaluator):
32 sigma(evaluator, title) = title
33 sigma(evaluator, institution) = institution
34 sigma(evaluator, name)= name
rating -> P(rating):
35 sigma(rating, MS) = MS
36 sigma(rating, PhD) = PhD
37 sigma(rating, English) = English
free-text -> P(free-text):
38 sigma(free-text, TXT) = TXT
39 sigma(free-text, PDF)= PDF
where P = ./student-data[@id=$login]
Q = ancestor::*[self::application[./student-data[@id=$login]/waiver/text()=’true’]]
R = ancestor::*[self::application[./student-data[@id=$login]]]
Figure 12: σ-function
NOTATE VIEW would set σ(B0 → P (B0) , B1) = B1[q1] for a suitable qualifier q1. Therefore, up to that point of
the execution of the algorithm, the theorem holds by setting p = ∅. During step 1 of algorithm BUILD VIEW it is
possible that the elimination of some N-children of B0 would modify the selection function for B1. By evaluating
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the σ (B0 → P (B0) , B1) expression constructed by step 4 of BUILD VIEW with the S→ operator and by induction
hypothesis we get
S→ [|σ(B0 → P (B0) , B1)|] (N) =
S→ [|σ(B0 → P (B0) , C)/σ(C → P (C) , B1) ∪ σ(B0 → P (B0) , B1)|] (N) =
S→ [|σ(B0 → P (B0) , C)/σ(C → P (C) , B1)|] (N) ∪ S→ [|σ(B0 → P (B0) , B1)|] (N) =
S→ [|σ(B0 → P (B0) , C)/σ(C → P (C) , B1)|] (N) ∪ S→ [|p0|] (N) ∪ S→ [|B1[q1]|] (N) =
S→ [|p1|] (N) ∪ S→ [|B1[q1]|] (N)
If B1 itself is eliminated from P (B0) this would not change the selection function constructed so far for B1.
For the inductive case, let B0 . . .Bn be the sequence of nodes and let Bi for i ∈ {1 . . . n− 1} be the last node that
is eliminated by step 1 of the algorithm BUILD VIEW. Since the DTD is not recursive neither σ (B0 → P (B0) , Bi),
nor σ (Bi → P (Bi) , Bn) can be changed by this step. By evaluating the S→ operator and by induction hypothesis
we get:
S→ [|σ(B0 → P (B0) , Bn)|] (N) =
S→ [|σ(B0 → P (B0) , Bi)/σ(Bi → P (Bi) , Bn) ∪ σ(B0 → P (B0) , Bn)|] (N) =
S→ [|σ(B0 → P (B0) , Bi)/σ(Bi → P (Bi) , Bn)|] (N) ∪ S→ [|σ(B0 → P (B0) , Bn)|] (N) =
S→ [|σ(Bi → P (Bi) , Bn)|] (S→ [|σ(B0 → P (B0) , Bi)|] (N)) ∪ S→ [|p0|] (N) =
S→ [|σ(Bi → P (Bi) , Bn)|] (S→ [|p1,i|] (N) ∪ S→ [|B1[q1]/ · · · /Bi[qi]|] (N)) ∪ S→ [|p0|] (N) =
S→ [|σ(Bi → P (Bi) , Bn)|] (S→ [|p1,i|] (N))∪
S→ [|σ(Bi → P (Bi) , Bn)|] (S→ [|B1[q1]/ · · · /Bi[qi]|] (N)) ∪ S→ [|p0|] (N) =
S→ [|p1|] (N) ∪ S→ [|σ(Bi → P (Bi) , Bn)|] (S→ [|B1[q1]/ · · · /Bi[qi]|] (N)) ∪ S→ [|p0|] (N) =
S→ [|p2|] (N) ∪ S→ [|σ(Bi → P (Bi) , Bn)|] (S→ [|B1[q1]/ · · · /Bi[qi]|] (N)) =
S→ [|p2|] (N) ∪ S→ [|pi+1,n|] (S→ [|B1[q1]/ · · · /Bi[qi]|] (N))∪
S→ [|Bi+1[qi+1]/ · · · /Bn[qn]|] (S→ [|B1[q1]/ · · · /Bi[qi]|] (N)) =
S→ [|p2|] (N) ∪ S→ [|p3|] (N) ∪ S→ [|B1[q1]/ · · · /Bi[qi]/Bi+1[qi+1]/ · · · /Bn[qn]|] (N) =
S→ [|p|] (N) ∪ S→ [|B1[q1]/ · · · /Bn[qn]|] (N)
The case i = n is similar to the above one by combining the reasoning for the base case and the intermediate case
above. 2
Remark 6.1 In the statement of the lemma we have no condition on the labelling of either B0 or Bn as this would
make the induction hypothesis needed for the proof not strong enough. Equally we need to quantify over all sets N
or the composition of two intermediate sequences during the induction step would not have an inductive hypothesis
strong enough.
Theorem 6.3: Let (D, ann) be a authorization specification, D is non-recursive, let (Dv, σ) the security view con-
structed by Algorithms ANNOTATE VIEW and BUILD VIEW. Let T be a document, TA the authorized version of T
and TS the materialized version of T with respect to (Dv, σ). Then TA is isomorphic to TS . 2
Proof: The proof is done by a top-down induction on T . The root of T is clearly in both TA and TS .
By induction, assume that n is of element type A, and is in both TA and TS . We must show that each child n in TA is
also a child of n in TS , and vice versa. The result will then follow, as the order of the children of n is the same in both
documents. Note, that for this to work it is essential that nodes in A should be ordered with the old order.
Let, therefore, m be a child of n in TA, of type B. Assume, first, that m is a child of n in the original document T .
Consider the fully annotated DTD (DF , ann′). Since n is in TS , ann′(A) = Y. Sincem is in TA, it follows that ann(B)
cannot be equal to N, and hence ann′(B) = Y, and so element type B is in Dv . Furthermore, if ann(B) = Q[q], then
q must hold at m.
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We must show that m is in S→ [|σ (A→ P (A) , B)|] ({n}). Let p = σ(A,B). The algorithm ANNOTATE VIEW
initially sets p = B (step 2), may replace p by B[q] in step 12, and may add additional disjuncts in step 2 of algo-
rithm BUILD VIEW. In all cases m is clearly in the result.
Now consider the case where m is not a child, but a descendant, of n in T . Let n, n1, . . . , nk, m (k ≥ 1) be the
sequence of nodes in T from n to m, of element types B1, . . . , Bk. Since these nodes are not present in TA, each
ann(Bi) (1 ≤ i ≤ k) must be either undefined, N or Q[qi], with the qualifier in the latter case evaluating to false at ni.
Furthermore, ann(B) must be either Y or a qualifier Q[q] that evaluates to true at m, which implies that B is in Dv .
To show that m is in S→ [|σ(A,B)|] ({n}), observe first that DF contains element types B′j whenever ann(Bj) is
undefined or is a qualifier. For this part of the proof, we shall write B′j as a synonym for Bj in the remaining case,
when ann(Bj) = N. Whenever ann(Bi) is Q[qi], step 12 of the algorithm ANNOTATE VIEW initially sets σ(B′i−1, B′i)
to Bi[¬q] (writing B′0 = A, for convenience); when ann(Bi) = N or is undefined, σ(B′i−1, B′i) is initially set equal
to B′i in step 2 of ANNOTATE VIEW. Finally, step 1 of BUILD VIEW deletes elements types B′1, . . . , B′k, replacing
σ(A,B) by a disjunction of paths, and by lemma 6.2 we get:
S→ [|σ (A→ P (A) , B)|] ({n}) = S→ [|p ∪B1[¬q1]/B2[¬q2]/ · · · /Bk[¬qk]/B|] ({n})
with some of the qi’s absent, when ann(Bi) is N or undefined. It follows that m ∈ S→ [|σ(A,B)|] ({n}), as desired.
For the converse, let m be a child of n in TS . We must show that m is a child of n in TA.
From the definition of TS , m must be in the result of evaluating σ(A,B) at n. Let n = n0, n1, . . . , nk, m = nk+1
(k ≥ 0) be the shortest path from n to m that is used in the evaluation of the σ function, and let σ′ be the value of
the σ function after application of the algorithm ANNOTATE VIEW. We claim that ni+1 ∈ S→ [|σ(Bi, Bi+1)|] ({ni})
(0 ≤ i ≤ k, B0 = A, Bk+1 = B). We show this by induction on the last Bi eliminated in step 1 of BUILD VIEW: this
step replaces σ(Bi−1, Bi+1) by
σ(Bi−1, Bi)/σ(Bi, Bi+1) + σ(Bi−1, Bi+1) .
By our induction hypothesis, ni+1 ∈ S→ [|σ(Bi−1, Bi+1)|] ({ni−1}). If ni+1 was in the second disjunct above, we
would have a contradiction with assumption that our path was the shortest. Therefore we have ni+1 ∈ S→ [|σ(Bi, Bi+1)|] ({ni})
and ni ∈ S→ [|σ(Bi−1, Bi)|] ({ni−1}), proving our claim. We therefore know that σ(Bi−1, Bi) is
1. Bi when ann(Bi) is either N or undefined. The case ann(Bi) = Y is impossible except when i = k + 1, as the
element type in question is deleted in step 1 of BUILD VIEW.
2. Bi[¬q] when ann(Bi) is Bi[¬qi].
In both case, it follows that n, m1, . . . , mk, m is a path in T . It remains to show that m1, . . . , mk are deleted in TA.
For nodes annotated with a qualifier, this is immediate; for other nodes it follows from the fact that the algorithm used
to define a complete annotation is the same in the definition of TA and in Algorithm ANNOTATE VIEW. 2
The complexity of the algorithm is as follows:
Theorem 6.4: Let (D, ann) be a authorization specification for a non-recursive DTD, let P be size of the largest
production rule in D. Let nY be the number of element types annotated with Y, and let nother the number of element
types otherwise annotated or not annotated. Then the size of the select function σ generated by the algorithm is
bounded by O(nother × |ann|) and the size of the View DTD Dv is bounded by O(nY × Pnother+1). 2
Proof: For the first bound observe that the introduction of the symbols / and ∪ in the definition of σ only happens
when eliminating an element type labelled with N in the fully annotated DTD, and there are at most nother element
types of this sort. All qualifiers appearing the σ are the same as qualifiers that were in the original authorization
specification, or their negations, and therefore their size is bounded by |ann|.
20
For the second step observe that we only replace occurrences of N-element types in a regular expression of a Y-labelled
element type with another regular expression, and that each of those replacement eliminates a N-labelled node. 2
The above upper bound is tight as the following example shows:
Example 6.4: Consider DTD with the production root → A0 and Ai → Ai+1Ai+1 for i = 0 . . . n − 1 and where
ann(A0) = N, ann(An) = Y. Then the DTD View Dv has only one rule
root→
2ntimes︷ ︸︸ ︷
An . . . An ,
and the select function is σ(root, An) = A0/ · · · /An. 2
7 Other security policies
Our model is based on a specific policy, used for determining a complete authorization specification of a document
based on a partial specification. This is the most-specific-takes-precedence policy [10]. Different applications may
have different requirements, and we now look at alternative approaches.
We can classify security policies using two orthogonal classifications that focus on completeness and consistency (De
Capitani di Vimercati and Samarati [10]). The first classification is based on how one handles unassigned values,
while the second is based on the handling of conflicting assignments and how one restores consistency.
We are interested only in policies that are complete and consistent:
Definition 7.1: A policy is complete and consistent if every partially annotated tree can be extend to a fully annotated
tree. 2
We list here several possible policies. These are variations of classical security policies that are used in other settings
([10]).
We have identified a number of policies for value propagation and conflict resolution:
Local Propagation Policy: “open”, “closed”, or “none”;
Hierarchy Propagation Policy: “topDown”, “bottomUp”, or “none”;
Structural Conflict Resolution: “localFirst”, “hierarchyFirst”, or “none”;
Value Conflict Resolution: “denialTakesPrecedence”, “permissionTakesPrecedence”, or “none”.
The Local Propagation Policy is similar to traditional policies for access control: in the case of “open”, if a node is not
labelled N then it is labelled by Y; in the case of “closed”, a node not labelled Y is labelled by N.
The Hierarchy Propagation Policy specifies node annotation inheritance in the tree. In the case of “topDown”, an
unlabelled node with a labelled parent inherits the label of its parent. In the case of “bottomUp” an unlabelled node
inherits the label from a labelled children. Note that the “bottomUp” case can result in conflicts, and they should be
addressed by the Value Conflict Resolution Policy.
The Structural Conflict Resolution Policy specifies whether the local or hierarchy rule takes precedence (“localFirst”
or “hierarchyFirst” respectively); while “none” means that the choice depends on the values and on the Value Conflict
Resolution Policy. The latter specifies how to resolve conflicts for unlabelled nodes that are assigned different labels
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hierarchy local structural conflict value conflict condition
topDown 6=none hierarchyFirst ∗ ∗
topDown none ∗ ∗ root is annotated
Table 1: topDown policy conditions
hierarchy local structural conflict value conflict condition
bottomUp 6=none hierarchyFirst 6=none ∗
bottomUp none ∗ 6=none leaves are annotated
Table 2: bottomUp policy conditions
by the preceding rules: N always has precedence over Y (“denialTakesPrecedence”); Y always has precedence over N
(“permissionTakesPrecedence”), and no choice (“noneTakesPrecedence”).
In the sequel we show some sufficient conditions for complete and consistent policy combinations. We start with some
policies that we can term topDown.
Proposition 7.1: All policies that satisfy one of the conditions of table 7.1 are sound and complete. 2
Proof: Assume that T is a partially annotated tree. We show that the annotation can be extended to a full tree.
Consider condition 1 of topDown security policy of table 7.1.
Base case: if the root is annotated then we are done. If it is not annotated then according to the definition it can obtain
its annotation from local security policy: Y/N if local=open/closed respectively. Thus root annotation is defined.
Inductive case: consider an arbitrary node n with annotated parent p. If n is annotated we are done. Otherwise, n
obtains its annotation from the parent since structural conflict=hierarchyFirst. Thus annotation of any node is
defined.
Consider condition 2 of topDown security policy of table 7.1.
Base case: the root is annotated.
Inductive case: consider an arbitrary node n with annotated parent p. If it is annotated we are done. Otherwise it
obtains its annotation from the parent. Thus annotation of any node is defined 2
Next we have some policies that we can term bottomUp.
Proposition 7.2: All policies that satisfy one of the conditions of table 7.2 are sound and complete. 2
Proof: . Assume that T is a partially annotated tree. We show that the annotation can be extended to full tree.
Consider condition 1 of bottomUp security policy of table 7.2.
Base case: if the children are annotated then we are done. If some of them are not annotated then according to the
condition they can obtain their annotation from local security policy: Y/N if local=open/closed respectively. Thus
annotation of all leaves is defined.
Inductive case: consider an arbitrary node n with all annotated children. If n is annotated we are done. Otherwise,
n obtains its annotation from the children since structural conflict=hierarchyFirst. However, different children
can have different annotation. On the other hand, value conflict 6=nothingTakesPrecedence can be used to
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hierarchy local structural conflict value conflict
∗ 6=none localFirst ∗
none 6=none ∗ ∗
Table 3: local policy conditions
hierarchy local structural conflict value conflict
6=none 6=none noneFirst 6=none
Table 4: multilabel policy conditions
define “winning” label. Thus annotation of any node is defined.
Consider condition 2 of bottomUp security policy of table 7.2.
Base case: all leaves are annotated.
Inductive case: consider an arbitrary node n with all annotated children. If it is annotated, we are done. Otherwise it
obtains its annotation from the children. However, different children can have different annotation. On the other hand,
value conflict 6=nothingTakesPrecedence can be used to define “winning” label. Thus annotation of any node
is defined. 2
Now we consider some policies that we can term local.
Proposition 7.3: All policies that satisfy one of the conditions of table 7.3 are sound and complete. 2
Proof: Assume that T is a partially annotated tree. We show that the annotation can be extended to full tree.
Consider condition 1 of local security policy of table 7.3. Since structural conflict = localFirst, local is enforced
in the first turn.
Consider case 2 of local security policy of table 7.3. Since hierarchy security policy is not defined, local is enforced.
Thus, for each not annotated node n, we enforce local security policy that assigns either a label Y or N depending on
local policy definition. 2
In some cases both hierarchy security policy and local security policy are defined, but structural conflict security pol-
icy is “noneFirst”. In these cases we apply both hierarchy and local security policy thus obtaining for each node a set of
more than one security annotation. So it is not really clear from the user specification what is really wanted. The “win-
ning” label is defined by means of value conflict security policy which should not be equal to “noneTakesPrecedence”.
We call such policies “resolvable multilabel” security policies.
Proposition 7.4: All policies that satisfy one of the conditions of table 7.4 are sound and complete. 2
Proof: Assume that T is a partially annotated tree. We show that the annotation can be extended to full tree.
Since structural conflict is not defined but both hierarchy and local are not “none”, we enforce both of them inde-
pendently (in cases when it is possible, e.g. if hierarchy = topDown but root is not annotated, we cannot enforce
hierarchy from the root; however, we can start enforcement of hierarchy policy from any annotated node, because
explicitly defined label overrides propagated one). As the result, for each node we will receive a set of labels. Since
value conflict is defined, it can be used for defining the “winning” label.
Since each node is assigned at least one label (considering local policy), partial annotation can be extended to full
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hierarchy local structural conflict value conflict
none none ∗ ∗
6=none 6=none none none
bottomUp ∗ hierarchyFirst none
bottomUp none 6=hierarchyFirst none
Table 5: unresolvable policy conditions
annotation. 2
Remark 7.1 All the other policies are classified as unresolvable: considering the table 7.1, policies following condi-
tion in line 1 are incomplete, policies in lines 2 and 3 of are inconsistent, policy in line 4 may be either inconsistent or
incomplete.
Extending the security view approach to other policies, such as these, requires modifying the construction of the
security view so that it propagates annotations in a way that corresponds to annotation propagation in the security
policy. We leave this to the future work.
8 Extending to Recursive DTDs
The restriction in our current proposal is the requirement of nonrecursive nature of DTDs. For authorization specifica-
tion of recursive DTD it is possible to derive a fully annotated DTD by modifying step 18 of the algorithm ANNOTATE
VIEW, but one cannot construct a select function in XPath that guarantees both secrecy and availability by modifying
step 1 of the algorithm BUILD VIEW.
The reason for this is that to handle with recursive DTDs correctly, one should repeat step 18 of ANNOTATE VIEW
until a fix point is reached. Then, if there are still unlabelled nodes they are part of a cycle of completely unlabelled
nodes. We could then consider all entry points of the cycle, and apply step 18 of ANNOTATE VIEW to all entry points
at the same time: if all generators of entry points outside the cycle are Y-nodes then all nodes of the cycle can be
labeled Y. The case for N is similar. In the case of conflicts, apply step 24 of ANNOTATE VIEW to all entry points of
the cycle at the same time. This process breaks progressively more cycles until all cycles get labelled.
The problem, however, is that XPath lacks the full Kleene-star operator. Thus we cannot select exactly the nodes in
which an element must be reached just after a particular loop is traversed an arbitrary number of times. It may be
possible to extend the security view with “dummy nodes” that map to epsilon rules, and obtain the desired result, but
such a solution would not be acceptable as the schema would be meaningless to the user. Using the present algorithm,
we can obtain an approximate solution: by stopping the modified ANNOTATE VIEW-algorithm after a finite number of
iterations of step 1 of BUILD VIEW-algorithm we have a secrecy preserving view.
The problem, however, is that XPath lacks the full Kleene-star operator. XPath language. Thus we cannot select
exactly the nodes in which an element must be reached just after a particular loop is traversed an arbitrary number of
times. It may be possible to extend the security view with “dummy nodes” that map to epsilon rules, and obtain the
desired result, but such a solution would not be acceptable as the schema would be meaningless to the user. Using
the present algorithm, we can obtain an approximate solution: by stopping the modified ANNOTATE VIEW-algorithm
after a finite number of iterations of step 1 of BUILD VIEW-algorithm we have a secrecy preserving view.
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〈xpath〉
¼ j
〈step〉 〈path〉
¼ ? j
θ 〈qual〉 〈qual〉. . . ?
j
〈step〉 〈path〉
¼ ? j
θ 〈qual〉 〈qual〉. . .
¼ ?
O1 Ok. . .
.
.
.
?
Figure 13: Parse tree schema
9 Query Rewriting
This section considers rewriting of user queries over security views V = (Dv, σ). More precisely, user provided with
the DTD view Dv poses a query over Dv . The query evaluation procedure may rely on two strategies:
• the naive strategy assumes that the user query is evaluated over the materialized security view TS that has been
extracted from initial data T by means of the σ-function or directly from the security annotation;
• the rewriting strategy transforms the user query q into an equivalent query qt using the σ-function over the initial
schema D. Query qt can be then evaluated over the initial data set T without materialization of TS .
The naive approach may be extremely time consuming in the case of very large XML files and multiple queries. On
the other hand, one could precompute and store data views TS . This approach may be inefficient for volatile data (e.g.
auction or stock sells) or for data in which integrity across views is important. Rewriting cost is insignificant compared
to the cost of view derivation from a large XML document.
Below we present our algorithm for query rewriting which has two phases: query parsing and further translation of
parsed query into σ-functions.
The user query is parsed according to the grammar that we have shown in Definition ??. Initially, we consider the
user query as 〈xpath〉. We process it recursively resulting in a parse tree according to the schema on Fig. 13. The
intuition of parse tree schema is the following. We divide 〈xpath〉 into 〈step〉 and remaining 〈path〉. 〈step〉 consists
of node test θ and zero or more qualifiers 〈qual〉. Each of these qualifiers represents a condition that the node test
should satisfy. The condition is a boolean function of several arguments (Oi, i = 1, k) which are either 〈path〉, literal,
or number.
Each node of the parse tree representation of user query is called a subquery.
For example, the XPath expression //a/b[(c/text() =‘school’) ∧ (parent :: q)]/d selects all nodes d that is a child
of b, b is a child of a and has parent q and child c with text node ‘school’, a is a descendant of root node. The parse
tree representation is depicted on Fig. 14
For each subquery p in XPath parse tree representation and for each element A in Dv we compute a local translation
rewrite(p,A) which is based on translations rewrite(pi, Bj), where pi is a direct subquery (child in parse tree) of p
andBj is a node reachable (the graph ofDv has a path toB) fromA. The rewritten query is located in rewrite(p, root)
where root is the root element of initial DTD D and p has a “normalized” format i.e. each step of path is rewritten
into form axisSpecifier :: label.
The algorithm presented in Fig. 15 shows the translation procedure. More precisely, in lines 1, 17, 29, 35 we can
distinguish whether the subexpression is 〈path〉, 〈qual〉, θ or θ[〈qual〉] respectively. In the case of 〈path〉 we process
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//a/b[(c/text() = ‘school‘) ∧ (parent :: q)]/d
¼ j
descendant :: a b[(c/text() = ‘school‘) ∧ (parent :: q)]/d
j¼
child :: b[(c/text() = ‘school‘) ∧ (parent :: q)] child :: d
¼ j
child :: b (c/text() = ‘school‘) ∧ (parent :: q)
j¼
c/text() = ‘school‘ parent :: q
¼ j
child :: c/text() ‘school‘
¼ j
child :: c child :: text()
Figure 14: Parse tree of expression //a/b[(c/text() =‘school’) ∧ (parent :: q)]/d
first 〈step〉 (which is represented as p1 in the “normalized” format) and then the remaining part as 〈path〉 (which is
rewritten to p2) recursively. The final step of 〈path〉 processing consists in joining p1 and p2 into path p1/p2 which
represents the initial 〈path〉 in “normalized” format where every step has the format axisSpecifier :: label. The
joining procedure is shown in lines 4- 16 of algorithm QUERY REWRITE.
Parsing θ[〈qual〉] handles separately predicate expression 〈qual〉 and node test θ. More precisely, node test θ should
be rewritten with respect to all DTD nodes in first turn. After that all filters are treated consequently as 〈path〉
expressions. But since predicates are posed on node test θ, the rewritten query will comprise the translation of filters
with respect to node test θ (q0 in algorithm). However, in the case of wildcard test (∗) the algorithm should find all the
appropriate nodes to which considered filters may be applied (see lines 46- 51 of QUERY REWRITE).
The processing of 〈qual〉 depends on arity of predicate function: either unary or binary. We process each operand
(either 〈path〉, literal or number) of the function. Since we deal with unary and binary functions, 〈qual〉 has no more
than two operands. In lines 21- 23 and 27-28 of QUERY REWRITE we perform joining procedure respectively for
binary and unary function.
Intuitively, processing of node test θ produces path in terms of σ from each element A of Dv to θ. If θ has child axis
specifier then rewrite(θ,A) = σ(A, θ). If axis specifier is parent, it means that instead of returning σ(A, θ) we
should return σ(θ,A) (σ−1(A, θ) is an alternative notation). For example, user poses query A/B. We should rewrite
it to σ(A,B). On the other hand, if user poses query A/parent :: B, we should find σ(B,A) and return σ−1(B,A),
i.e. the consequence of steps and corresponding axis specifiers of σ(B,A) should be changed on the contrary. For
example, if σ(B,A) = C/A which is equivalent to self :: B/child :: C/child :: A, then σ−1(B,A) = self ::
A/parent :: C/parent :: B. Steps 1– 11 of algorithm getTranslation depicted on Fig. 18 represent the process of
calculating σ−1(A,B).
This intuition corresponds to “neighbor” axis specifiers (e.g. child and parent). In case of descendant-or-self
(ancestor-or-self) we have to calculate all descendants (ancestors) and all possible paths to each descendant
(ancestor). Finally, all computed paths should be translated into the σ-function corresponding to the reverse property
of axis specifier. Obviously, descendant/ancestor processing requires a different approach. Thus we introduce two
auxiliary functions: processChildParent on Fig. 16 and processDescendAncest on Fig. 17. We should mention
that each of these functions also considers the case when the node label is ∗ (line 3 of processChildParent and
line 7 of processDescendAncest) which requires rewriting for a union of nodes reachable from considered DTD
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node according to axis specifier.
For rewriting of descendant/ancestor relations we use the data of the statically precomputed table preRewrite. The
idea of preRewrite calculation is borrowed from [12] where recProc and traverse procedures are intended to cap-
ture all the paths from all DTD nodes to all their corresponding descendants, and to translate these paths to an equiv-
alent paths over the initial DTD D. We updated subroutines recProc and traverse so that they precompute not only
descendant-or-self but also ancestor-or-self relations. Our preRewrite table is a recrw table of [12]
extended with the third dimension representing the DTD graph traversal: either in bottom up (ancestor-or-self)
or top down (descendant-or-self) direction.
The correctness of the algorithm follows immediately from the correctness of each step. Indeed, 〈path〉 processing
is correct if processing of both first 〈step〉 and remaining 〈path〉 is correct. The processing of 〈step〉 is correct
if processing of axis θ and all its filters 〈qual〉 is correct. The processing of 〈qual〉 is correct if processing of all its
operands is correct, where operand can be either 〈path〉 or literal, or number. We claim that processing of θ and binding
it with qualifiers is correct. Indeed, let us consider binding axis θ with qualifier. We assume that node test n and related
filter expressions f1, f2, ..., fq are processed correctly, i.e. for every DTD element v we built the correct rewriting of
expressions v/axisSpecifier::n, v/operandfj , j = 1, q, where operandfj is any operand of filter fj . Since filters
are posed on element n and n is one of DTD elements, the rewriting of expression n[fj ] for every DTD element v
should have form rewrite(n, v)[rewrite(fj , n)]. The latter is reflected in algorithm QUERY REWRITE in lines 41- 51.
Now we show the correctness of axis processing. As it was mentioned above, axis processing requires representation
of expression v/axisSpecifier::n in terms of σ function for every DTD element v. If axisSpecifier is child then
the rewritten expression is equal to σ(v, n) (in the case of n = ∗ it will be union of σ(v, childv) where childv is a
child of v). If axisSpecifier is parent then the rewritten expression is equal to σ−1(n, v) (again, in the case of
wildcard it will be the union of all reversed related σ functions). If axisSpecifier is descendant-or-self then
we use precomputed data of preRewrite table which consists of expressions representing all paths from v to n for all
DTD elements v and n. The correctness of construction such expressions is shown in [12]. As we said above, these
expressions are also rewritten in terms of σ function. If axisSpecifier is ancestor-or-self the expressions of
preRewrite table should be rewritten by means of reversed σ function (i.e. σ−1).
Comparing presented algorithm for query rewriting with that of provided by Fan et al. in [12], we would like to
mention the differences. First difference is related to processing of qualifiers: we do not distinguish different types of
qualifiers as it is done in [12]. Moreover, we consider the rewriting of qualifiers with respect to a subset of nodes to
which these qualifiers are applied. This approach provides clear binding between node test and filters related to this
node test. Furthermore, this binding is absent in the query rewriting algorithm presented in [12]. Another distinction
lies in treatment of node tests θ. More precisely, according to our notion of parsing tree, the smallest (the latest) entity
of parsing procedure (the leaf of parse tree) is an axis θ which is either label or wildcard. It means, that we do not
distinguish a separated subpath ∗ as it is done by Fan et al. We consider ∗ as a type of axis. The same remark can
be done for treatment of descendants: from our point of view “descendant” is a characteristics of axis rather than
distinguishable subpath. The last and most prominent advantage of our approach is that it can accept user queries
containing reverse axis specifiers such as parent and ancestor-or-self.
10 Implementation
At the University of Trento we have implemented a preliminary version of a Java tool that accepts user queries and
returns answers as an XML document that is constructed from the set of nodes which are both visible to the user and
satisfy the query conditions.
The tool consists of the following main components:
• DTD Parser: we extended the Wutka DTD parser 2 to be able to extract the security policy from the root element
2http://www.wutka.com/dtdparser.html
27
Algorithm: QUERY REWRITE
Input: a subquery q (as a string)
Output: a query p locally rewritten in terms of σ(as a string)
1: if q is 〈path〉 then
// q = firstStep/remainingSteps
2: q1 = q.getFirstStep(); p1 = QUERY REWRITE(q1);
3: q2 = q.getRemainingSteps(); p2 = QUERY REWRITE(q2);
4: p = p1/p2;
5: for all elements A of Dv do
6: if rewrite(p1, A) = ∅ then
7: rewrite(p,A) = ∅; reach(p,A) = ∅;
8: else
9: newRw = ∅;
10: for each v in reach(p1, A) do
11: newRw = newRw ∪ rewrite(p2, v);
12: reach(p,A) = reach(p,A) ∪ reach(p2, v);
13: if newRw 6= ∅ then
14: rewrite(p,A) = rewrite(p1, A)/newRw;
15: else
16: rewrite(p,A) = ∅; reach(p,A) = ∅;
17: else if q is 〈qual〉 then
18: if q has two operands then
19: q1 is the first operand; p1 = QUERY REWRITE(q1);
20: q2 is the second operand; p2 = QUERY REWRITE(q2);
21: p = p1 q.getOperator() p2;
22: for all elements A of Dv do
23: rewrite(p,A) = rewrite(p1, A) q.getOperator() rewrite(p2, A);
24: else
// q has one operand, i.e. function is either not, unary minus
// or empty operator. The latter means that q does not have
// operator at all (e.g. q is 〈path〉)
25: q0 is the operand; p0 = QUERY REWRITE(q0);
26: q.getOperator() p = p0 q.getOperator();
27: for all elements A of Dv do
28: rewrite(p,A) =q.getOperator()rewrite(p0, A);
29: else if q is θ then
30: label = q.getLabel(); axisSpecifier = q.getAxisSpecifier();
31: if axisSpecifier is ‘child’ or ‘parent’ then
32: p =processChildParent(label, axisSpecifier);
33: else if axisSpecifier is ‘descendant-or-self’ or ‘ancestor-or-self’ then
34: p =processDescendAncest(label, axisSpecifier);
35: else if q is θ[〈qual〉] then
// q = nodeTest[filter1] . . . [filtern]
36: q0 = q.getNodeTest();
37: p = q0;
38: for all filters of q do
39: qi is the next filter; pi = QUERY REWRITE(qi);
40: p′ = p[qi];
41: for all elements A of Dv do
42: if q0.getNodeLabel() 6= ∗ then
43: rewrite(p′, A) = rewrite(p,A)[rewrite(qi, q0.getNodeLabel())];
44: reach(p′, A) = q0.getNodeLabel();
45: else
46: newRw = ∅;
47: for all elements v in reach(q0, A) do
48: newRw = newRw ∪ rewrite(qi, v);
49: if newRw 6= ∅ then
50: rewrite(p′, A) = rewrite(p,A)[newRw];
51: reach(p′, A) = reach(p′, A) ∪ reach(q0, A);
52: p = p′;
53: else if (q is literal) or (q is number) then
54: p = q;
55: rewrite(p,A) = p;
56: return rewrite(p, root);
Figure 15: Algorithm QUERY REWRITE
and security annotation of each DTD element. The DTD Parser returns a special object DTD representing a set
of DTD elements (DTDElement), their attributes (DTDAttribute) and children configuration. The latter is
organized as a container (DTDContainer object) of items (DTDItem object). Each item is either a container
or an element name (DTDName object). Moreover, containers can be of three kinds: sequence (DTDSequence,
i.e. items delimited by commas), choice (DTDChoice, i.e. items are delimited by vertical bars), and mixed
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Algorithm: processChildParent
Input: node label label, node axis specifier axisSpecifier (as a string)
Output: a query p locally rewritten in terms of σ
1: p = axisSpecifier::label;
2: for all elements A of Dv do
3: if label = ∗ then
4: for each node v that is in relation axisSpecifier with A do
5: σ = getTranslation(A,v,isReverse(axisSpecifier));
6: rewrite(p,A) = rewrite(p,A) ∪ σ;
7: reach(p,A) = reach(p,A) ∪ v
8: else
9: if label is in relation axisSpecifier with A then
10: rewrite(p,A) =getTranslation(A,v,isReverse(axisSpecifier));
11: reach(p,A) = label;
12: else
13: rewrite(p,A) = ∅; reach(p,A) = ∅;
14: return p;
Figure 16: Algorithm processChildParent
Algorithm: processDescendAncest
Input: node label label, node axis specifier axisSpecifier (as a string)
Output: a query p locally rewritten in terms of σ
1: p = axisSpecifier::label;
2: if axisSpecifier = descendant-or-self then
3: q =‘’;
4: else
// axisSpecifier = ancestor-or-self
5: q =‘’;
6: for all elements A of Dv do
7: if label = ∗ then
// reach(q, A) and preRewrite(q, A,B) are precomputed
8: for each B in reach(q, A) do
9: if preRewrite(q, A,B) 6= ∅ then
10: rewrite(p,A) = rewrite(p,A) ∪ preRewrite(q, A,B);
11: reach(p,A) = reach(p,A) ∪ B
12: else
13: if preRewrite(q, A, label) 6= ∅ then
14: rewrite(p,A) = rewrite(p,A) ∪ preRewrite(q, A, label);
15: reach(p,A) = reach(p,A) ∪ label
16: return p;
Figure 17: Algorithm processDescendAncest
Algorithm: getTranslation
Input: elements A, B of Dv (as string), node axis specifier direction reverse (as boolean)
Output: a σ(A,B) in direct or reverse direction
1: if reverse = true then
// σ(B,A) is an existing PathExpression
// we want σ−1(B,A)
2: str =‘parent :: B’;
3: σ(B,A) = σ(B,A).getRemainingSteps();
4: while σ(B,A) 6= ∅ do
5: step = σ(B,A).getFirstStep();
6: σ(B,A) = σ(B,A).getRemainingSteps();
7: if σ(B,A) 6= ∅ then
8: p = self :: step/p;
9: else
10: p = parent :: step/p;
11: return p
// p = σ−1(B,A)
12: else
13: return σ(A,B);
Figure 18: Algorithm getTranslation
(DTDMixed, i.e. includes PCDATA). However Wutka’s DTDElement object has two significant drawbacks:
container configuration complicates the process of retrieval of children set, and DTDElement does not pro-
vides access to parents. To overcome these limitations, we added to DTDElement class two additional fields:
children and parents representing plain lists of children and parents names respectively. Thus these fields
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represent graph structure of input DTD. Their content is formed at the step of DTD parsing.
• View Builder: implements algorithms ANNOTATE VIEW and BUILD VIEW.
• Query Parser: we used the SAXON 3 processor to parse XPath expression into their tree representation. Query
Parser also performs evaluation of the rewritten query over XML source. This functionality is stipulated by
the SAXON XPath query implementation via the XPathEvaluator object which is able to parse the XML
source, to create the intermediate parse tree representation of the XPath query, and finally to evaluate parsed
query over the XML document. In addition Query Parser performs output of answer set to an XML file.
• Query Rewriter: implements algorithm QUERY REWRITE
• DOM Validator: performs checks of the validity of XML document (i.e. XML document should conform to
the rules of DTD schema), parses XML into DOM tree, and produces the materialized view. We used Xerses 4
processor for these purposes.
To write the XML file (either materialized view or answer set), we use JAXP DocumentBuilder 5.
Firstly, Wutka DTD parser is used to parse DTD stored in dtd-file. As it was said above, we modified Wutka DTD
parser so that it could be able to distinguish annotation introduces in Sec. 4. Then partially annotated DTD is extended
to a full annotated one according to the algorithm ANNOTATE VIEW. Next we apply BUILD VIEW to produce Dv
(schema of accessible data) and σ-function which is used to materialize view of XML document TS according to the
algorithm MATERIALIZE.
Example 10.1: Fig. 26 shows an initial XML document corresponding to DTD of Fig. 4. Fig. 27 and Fig. 28 represent
XML view for user with login “dkonovalov” and “vromanov” respectively. Both views correspond to DTD view of
Fig. 11 and are extracted by means of σ-function of Fig. 12 during application of algorithm MATERIALIZE.
We should note, that each student has an access only to relevant data, i.e. Dmitry Konovalov with login “dkonovalov”
is not able to see the data of Vladimir Romanov having login “vromanov” and vice versa. Moreover, Vladimir Ro-
manov is forbidden to see the content of recommendation letters except of the names of his evaluators, while Dmitry
Konovalov has an access to full content of all recommendation letters. This is because the former student didn’t waive
his right to inspect the content of recommendation letters (waiver=“false”) while the latter did. Furthermore, no one
student is permitted to see elements unreliable, reason, letter, favorable, unfavorable. 2
11 Experimental Results
11.1 Experimental framework
XML documents. To generate a set of XML documents we use XMark benchmark [1]. The benchmark data generator
produces XML documents modelling an auction web-site. Number and type of elements in resulting XML depend on
parameter called factor. The significant feature of XMark benchmark is the generation of one unique XML document
for one factor value.
We generated 31 XML documents with factor i/10000, i = 100, 130. The size of these XML files varies from 1Mb to
1.2Mb.
Security annotation. XMark benchmark provides the DTD schema auctions.dtd which describes an auction scenario.
It defines 77 elements describing a list of auction items, information about bidders, sellers, buyers, etc.
3http://saxon.sourceforge.net/
4http://xml.apache.org/xerces2-j/
5http://java.sun.com/xml/jaxp
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<!ATTLIST catgraph security_annotation_data
CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST regions security_annotation_data
CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST categories security_annotation_data
CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST person
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Q"
security_annotation_xpath
CDATA #FIXED "self::node()[@id=$login]">
<!ATTLIST open_auction
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Q"
security_annotation_xpath CDATA
#FIXED "./bidder/personref[@person=$login]">
<!ATTLIST closed_auction
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Q"
security_annotation_xpath CDATA
#FIXED "./buyer[@person=$login]">
<!ATTLIST privacy security_annotation_data
CDATA #FIXED "N">
Figure 19: Buyer policy
<!ATTLIST catgraph security_annotation_data
CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST regions security_annotation_data
CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST categories security_annotation_data
CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST creditcard
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Q"
security_annotation_xpath CDATA #FIXED
"parent::person[@id=$login]">
<!ATTLIST profile
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Q"
security_annotation_xpath CDATA #FIXED
"parent::person[@id=$login]">
<!ATTLIST buyer
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Q"
security_annotation_xpath CDATA #FIXED
"parent::person/seller[@person=$login]">
<!ATTLIST open_auction
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Q"
security_annotation_xpath CDATA #FIXED
"seller[@person=$login]">
<!ATTLIST closed_auction
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST privacy security_annotation_data
CDATA #FIXED "N">
Figure 20: Seller policy
We have defined three user roles:
• buyer: can see personal information, open auctions where he is one of the bidders, closed auction where he is a
buyer. Buyer cannot see privacy info, data about regions, category graph and categories. DTD representation of
buyer’s policy is depicted in Fig. 19.
• seller: is permitted to see own profile and credit card info, as well as open auctions where he is a seller. Seller can
also see who buys his items. Seller cannot see privacy info, data about regions, category graph and categories.
Seller’s policy is shown in Fig. 20.
• visitor: is allowed to read information about bidders, sellers and buyers. Personal info and privacy info, as well
as data about regions, category graph and categories are unavailable for visitor. Security annotation for seller is
presented in Fig. 21.
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<!ATTLIST catgraph security_annotation_data
CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST regions security_annotation_data
CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST categories security_annotation_data
CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST buyer
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST seller
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST bidder
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "Y">
<!ATTLIST people security_annotation_data
CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST open_auction
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST closed_auction
security_annotation_data CDATA #FIXED "N">
<!ATTLIST privacy security_annotation_data
CDATA #FIXED "N">
Figure 21: Visitor policy
Table 6: Query rewriting evaluation
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
buyer 12.5 11.2 7.2 15.7 11
seller 11 10.8 9.5 14.1 15.7
visitor 3.2 0 0 0 1.6
For all three roles we assume that root site is annotated by Y policy propagation is performed in top down manner,
default security policy is closed.
Queries. We consider the following set of queries to be evaluated over the data set:
Q1 = .//person/name
Q2 = .//open auction/(bidder|quantity)
Q3 = .//open auction[seller and bidder]
Q4 = .// ∗ [name]/parent :: people/person
Q5 = .//bidder/parent :: ∗
Thus all queries contain a step with axis specifier descendant-or-self. Moreover queryQ2 has union operation,
predicate with ∧ operation is included in query Q3, examples of usage of ∗ and reverse axis specifier (parent) are
shown in queries Q4 and Q5.
11.2 Evaluation
In Table 6 we show the time that is required to rewrite queries Qi, i = 1, 5 over DTD views built for roles buyer, seller
and visitor. Since we rewrote queries for each XML file (we have 31 different XML files) and for each login (we have
10 logins), each cell of Table 6 presents time (in milliseconds) as arithmetic mean of 310 relevant values.
How do we validate the effectiveness of the approach? The simplest approach is simply to materialize the view and
then run the user’s query on it. We call this approach the naive approach. This is what could be done following the
previous approaches such as Bertino et al. or Damiani et al. Then a second question come: how do we evaluate the
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Figure 22: Comparison of size of initial and materialized XML files for visitor
running time: do we materialize the view for each and every query or we just materialize it once and amortize the
materialized time over many queries.
However, trying to decrease processing time by storing materialized view cannot work in this setting. Recall that
this is the materialized view for one user and different users may have different views. On the XMark benchmark,
since policy for buyer and seller include conditions on user login, we should preserve and select views for all logins
and all roles. For example, the smallest XML document that we generated by XMark has approximately 250 people
identifiers. Each of these people may want to see the data stored in that XML.
In Fig. 22 we show the comparison of size of the initial XML document and its materialized view. The policy of visitor
role does not contain any login-based conditions. Therefore views are the same for all logins. However, the size of
materialized view is around 100Kb provided the initial XML file is 1Mb size. Views for seller are even bigger. And if
we want to store the views for all sellers we should reserve 25Mb of space only for one role. Moreover real-life data
may require much more space. Finally, maintaining the integrity of fast changing auction data in 250 views is hardly
an effective solution.
At the other side of the spectrum we can apply the query rewriting algorithm to the unmaterialized view. We call this
approach the advanced approach. In the remaining of the paper we compare the naive and the advanced approach
on each individual query, as we have already ruled out as infeasible the notion of amortizing the materialization over
many queries.
Next we compare two strategies of query answering: naive and advanced. For each XML document we ran evaluation
of each query from the viewpoint of 10 users (login = personi, i = 1, 10). Moreover, each user tries to login under
different roles. One dimension of our evaluation is query evaluation time depending on the size of initial XML file.
In advanced approach time depends on the following steps:
1. DTD parsing, DTD annotation and building of DTD view Dv;
2. query parsing;
3. query rewriting;
4. evaluation of query over initial XML source.
In naive approach time measurement is conditioned by the following steps:
1. DTD parsing, DTD annotation and building of DTD view Dv;
2. building of sanitized XML source (view materialization);
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Figure 23: Query evaluation for buyer role
Figure 24: Query evaluation for seller role
Figure 25: Query evaluation for visitor role
3. query parsing
4. evaluation of query over sanitized XML source.
We emphasized with bold font those steps that are specific for a particular approach.
Figures 23, 24 and 25 show the dependency of query evaluation time on the size of the initial XML document for buyer,
seller and visitor respectively. Horizontal axis represents XML size in bytes, vertical axis shows query evaluation time
in milliseconds. In all three pictures we can see two main trends: upper trend (diamonds) is produced by the naive
approach, lower one (triangles) stands for advanced approach. It is easy to see that naive approach answers user query
much slower than the advanced one.
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Concluding this section, we should mention that there is no implementation available for either Stoika and Farkas or
Fan et al.
12 Related Work and Conclusions
A number of security models have been proposed for XML (see [13] for a recent survey). Specifying security
constraints with XPath on top of document DTDs was discussed in [9]. The semantics of access control to a user is
a specific view of the document determined by the XPath access-control rules. A view derivation algorithm is based
on tree labelling. Issues like granularity of access, access-control inheritance, overriding, and conflict resolution are
studied in [4, 9].
A different approach is explored in [7]. In a nutshell, access annotations are explicitly included in the actual ele-
ment nodes in XML, whereas DTD nodes specify “coarse” conditions on the existence of security specifications in
corresponding XML nodes. Only elements with accessible annotations appear in the result of a query.
Stoica and Farkas [22] proposed to produce single-level views of XML when conforming DTD is annotated by labels of
different confidentiality level. The key idea lies in analyzing semantic correlation between element types, modification
of initial structure of DTD and using cover stories. Altered DTD then undergoes “filtering” when only element types
of the confidentiality lever no higher that the requester’s one are extracted. However, the proposal requires expert’s
analysis of semantic meaning of production rules, and this can be unacceptable if database contains a large amount of
schemas which are changed occasionally.
This paper elaborates on certain issues left open in [12]. In particular, we studied access control and security specifi-
cations defined over general DTDs in terms of regular expressions rather than normalized DTDs of [12]. Furthermore,
we developed a new algorithm for deriving a security view definition from more intuitive access control specification
(w.r.t. a non-recursive DTD) without introducing dummy element types, and thus preventing inference of sensitive
information from the XML structure revealed by dummies.
In this paper, we have also studied the performance of answering queries on an XML database, subject to access
control annotations applied on the original DTD. We show that the query rewriting approach compared to the naive
one is more efficient in sense of time and space.
Time effectiveness takes place because we are delivered from view materialization which is a very time consuming
operation. In our experimental benchmark the query rewriting strategy issues answer for user query approximately one
hundred times faster than the naive strategy. Another considered point is the space preserving property of advanced
method: naive approach in our experimental framework generates views that require 2.5 times more space than the
initial data set. Moreover, the number of views can be extremely large that may cause problems with the maintenance
of data integrity.
Several extensions to the security model are targeted for future work. First, we plan to extend the definitions of
security views and authorization specifications by supporting more complex XML Schema [11] instead of DTDs.
Second, we are also studying extensions of our algorithm for deriving security-view definitions with respect to re-
cursive DTDs/schemas. Third, we intend to evaluate the effect of different security policies, whether the notion of
security view can be adapted to all, or some, of these security policies, and the design of efficient algorithms for those
cases where this is possible. Finally, our next step toward enforcing inference control will be to investigate reasoning
techniques in the presence of integrity constraints and ID/IDREF attributes.
Acknowledgments. This project has been partially supported by the MIUR-FIBR project ASTRO and the MIUR-
COFIN “Web-based management and representation of spatial and geographical data”.
35
References
[1] XMark – An XML Benchmark Project. http://monetdb.cwi.nl/xml/index.html.
[2] H. Ahonen. Disambiguation of SGML content models. In Proceedings of PODP, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 27–37, 1996.
[3] M. Benedikt, W. Fan, and G. M. Kuper. Structural properties of XPath fragments. In Proceedings of the Inter-
national Conference on Database Theory, 2003.
[4] E. Bertino and E. Ferrari. Secure and selective dissemination of XML documents. ACM Transactions on Infor-
mation and System Security, 5(3):290–331, 2002.
[5] T. Bray, J. Paoli, and C. M. Sperberg-McQueen. Extensible Markup Language (XML) 1.0. W3C, Feb. 1998.
[6] A. Bru¨ggemann-Klein and D. Wood. One-unambiguous regular languages. Information and Computation, pages
182–206, 1998.
[7] S. Cho, S. Amer-Yahia, L. Lakshmanan, and D. Srivastava. Optimizing the secure evaluation of twig queries. In
Proceedings of the International Conference on Very Large Data Bases, 2002.
[8] J. Clark and S. DeRose. XML Path Language (XPath) Version 1.0. W3C Recommendation.
http://www.w3.org/TR/xpath, November 1999.
[9] E. Damiani, S. De Capitani di Vimercati, S. Paraboschi, and P. Samarati. A fine-grained access control system
for XML documents. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 5(2):169–202, 2002.
[10] S. De Capitani di Vimercati and P. Samarati. Access control: Policies, models, and mechanism. In R. Focardi
and F. Gorrieri, editors, Foundations of Security Analysis and Design - Tutorial Lectures, volume 2171 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science. Springer-Verlag, 2001.
[11] D. C. Fallside and P. Walmsley. XML Schema Part 0: Primer Second Edition. W3C Recommendation.
http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlschema-0/, 2004.
[12] W. Fan, C.-Y. Chan, and M. Garofalakis. Secure XML querying with security views. In Proceedings of the 2004
ACM SIGMOD International Conference on Management of Data, pages 587–598. ACM Press, 2004.
[13] I. Fundulaki and M. Marx. Specifying access control policies for XML documents with XPath. In Proceedings
of the 9th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies, pages 61–69. ACM Press, 2004.
[14] S. K. Goel, C. Clifton, and A. Rosenthal. Derived access control specification for XML. In Proceedings of the
2nd ACM Workshop On XML Security, pages 1–14. ACM Press, 2003.
[15] G. Gottlob, C. Koch, and R. Pichler. Efficient algorithm for processing XPath queries. In Proceedings of the
International Conference on Very Large Data Bases, 2002.
[16] S. Hada and M. Kudo. XML Access Control Language: Provisional Authorization for XML Documents.
http://www.trl.ibm.com/projects/xml/xacl/, 2000.
[17] T. F. Lunt, D. E. Denning, R. R. Schell, M. Heckman, and W. R. Shockley. The SeaView security model. IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering, 16(6):593–607, 1990.
[18] G. Miklau and D. Suciu. Controlling access to published data using cryptography. In Proceedings of the Inter-
national Conference on Very Large Data Bases (VLDB), pages 898–909, September 2003.
[19] M. Murata, A. Tozawa, M. Kudo, and S. Hada. XML access control using static analysis. In Proceedings of the
10th ACM conference on Computer and communication security, pages 73–84. ACM Press, 2003.
36
[20] X. Qian. View-based access control with high assurance. In Proceedings of the 15th IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, pages 85–93. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1996.
[21] P. D. Stachour and B. Thuraisingham. Design of LDV: A multilevel secure relational database management
system. IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 2(2):190–209, 1990.
[22] A. Stoica and C. Farkas. Secure XML views. In Research Directions in Data and Applications Security, IFIP
WG 11.3 Sixteenth International Conference on Data and Applications Security, volume 256, pages 133–146.
Kluwer, 2003.
[23] J. Wang and S. L. Osborn. A role-based approach to access control for XML databases. In Proceedings of the
9th ACM symposium on Access control models and technologies, pages 70–77. ACM Press, 2004.
37
<?xml version=’1.0’?> <!DOCTYPE applications SYSTEM ’input.dtd’>
<applications>
<application>
<student-data id=’dkonovalov’>
<department>CS</department><degree>PhD</degree>
<name>Dmitry Konovalov</name><waiver>true</waiver></student-data>
<recommendation-letter>
<evaluator>
<title>Full Professor</title>
<institution>University of Suncity</institution>
<name>Albert Wasserman</name></evaluator>
<letter><unfavorable>
<rating>
<MS>average</MS><PhD>not recommended</PhD><English>below average</English>
</rating>
<free-text>
<TXT>link to txt-file goes here</TXT></free-text>
</unfavorable></letter>
</recommendation-letter>
<unreliable>
<recommendation-letter>
<evaluator>
<title>Researcher</title>
<institution>Magnificent Labs</institution>
<name>Maria Shaker</name></evaluator>
<letter><favorable>
<rating>
<MS>outstanding</MS>
<PhD>highly recommended</PhD>
<English>outstanding</English></rating>
<free-text>
<PDF>link to pdf-file goes here</PDF></free-text>
</favorable></letter>
</recommendation-letter>
<reason>The recommender does not exist.</reason>
</unreliable>
</application>
<application>
<student-data id=’vromanov’>
<department>CS</department><degree>PhD</degree>
<name>Vladimir Romanov</name><waiver>false</waiver></student-data>
<unreliable>
<recommendation-letter>
<evaluator>
<title>Researcher</title>
<institution>Magnificent Labs</institution>
<name>Maria Shaker</name></evaluator>
<letter><favorable>
<rating>
<MS>outstanding</MS>
<PhD>highly recommended</PhD>
<English>outstanding</English></rating>
<free-text>
<PDF>link to pdf-file goes here</PDF></free-text>
</favorable></letter>
</recommendation-letter>
<reason>The recommender does not exist.</reason>
</unreliable>
</application>
</applications>
Figure 26: Initial XML
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<applications>
<application>
<student-data id="dkonovalov">
<department>CS</department>
<degree>PhD</degree>
<name>Dmitry Konovalov</name>
<waiver>true</waiver>
</student-data>
<recommendation-letter>
<evaluator>
<title>Full Professor</title>
<institution>University of Suncity</institution>
<name>Albert Wasserman</name>
</evaluator>
<rating>
<MS>average</MS>
<PhD>not recommended</PhD>
<English>below average</English>
</rating>
<free-text>
<TXT>link to txt-file goes here</TXT>
</free-text>
</recommendation-letter>
<recommendation-letter>
<evaluator>
<title>Researcher</title>
<institution>Magnificent Labs</institution>
<name>Maria Shaker</name>
</evaluator>
<rating>
<MS>outstanding</MS>
<PhD>highly recommended</PhD>
<English>outstanding</English>
</rating>
<free-text>
<PDF>link to pdf-file goes here</PDF>
</free-text>
</recommendation-letter>
</application>
</applications>
Figure 27: XML view for student Dmitry Konovalov
<applications>
<application>
<student-data id="vromanov">
<department>CS</department>
<degree>PhD</degree>
<name>Vladimir Romanov</name>
<waiver>false</waiver>
</student-data>
</application>
</applications>
Figure 28: XML view for student Vladimir Romanov
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